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'terred by having to investigate which States had enacted relevant 
1tion and its practical effects, thereby undermining one of the primary 
>ses of the legislation, which is to attract international arbitration to 
alia. The deletion of section 29 ensures that a single Australian 
monwealth) law will govern all international commercial arbitrations 
1cted in Australia, unless the parties themselves choose otherwise. 
The Editors 
tionary Lessons from American Securities Arbitration: 
Litigation v. Arbitration 
~United States, it is now quite common for lawyers and others to bemoan 
is often referred to as 'the litigation crisis. ' 1 No less an authority than 
'r Chief Justice Warren Burger has long complained that American courts 
become overburdened' by too may 1awsuits. 2 Echoing other 
1entators, Burger recommends arbitration as 'a better way to do it. ' 3 Just 
'carpenter's handsaw as replaced by the power saw, ' 4 so is arbitration the 
rn power tool to replace litigation in court. Similarly, the Report of the 
gious American Bar Association's Commission on Professionalism 
1m ends expanded use of arbitration in lieu of a norrnal trial before a judge 
ty jury-' 
ere should be no rush to judgment favouring arbitration. In the first place, 
ot at all clear that there is a litigation crisis in the United States. Criticism 
so-called litigation explosion is based more on anecdotal evidence than 
tl empirical studies. The empirical studies that do exist show that the 
ion rate in the United States during the 1970's, for example, is only about 
f what it was during the nineteenth century. 6 American courts may appear 
led to the average observer, but we should realise that there are fewer 
g., Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Liulejustice: An Argument for DeLegalising America, Atlantic Monthly, July 
79, at p. 25; Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 Stanford Law Review 567 ( 1975). 
Lrger, lsn 't There A Better Way?, 68 American Bar Association Journal 274, 275 (1982). 
at 276. 
at 274. 
}A Commission on Professionalism, . In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of 
wyer Professionalism (1986). This Report is reviewed in Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A 
mmentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commt:w·on on Professionalism, 18 Loyola University 
Chicago Law Journal 1149·80 (1987). Portions of this present Note are adapted from pp.1162-64 of 
l.t article. 
tlanter, What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious 
·z"ety, 31 University of California-Los Angeles Law Review 4, 38 (1983). 
c also, Blum, Litigation 'Epidemic' in a Teapot?, 11 National Law Journal 3, col. 1-2, & 16, col. 1-4 Q an. 
, 1989), discussing a report of a new study of85,000 federal lawsuits by The RAND Corporation. 
200 Arbitration International 
judges per capita in the United States compared to other western nations. I Fo 
example, 28% of all German lawyers are judges, but only 4% of America1 
lawyers are judges; while Germany, a country of 61 million people, has 17,001 
judges, the United States, a country of 240 million people, has only 18,001 
judges. 8 If there is a litigation problem in the United States, the problem is no 
too many lawsuits; it is too few judges, overworked and underpaid. 
Nonetheless, it is quite common in the United States for law reformers tl 
urge arbitration in order to decrease the amount oflitigation. Before embracin<1 
this proposed solution, however, we should take note of some of the misgiving 
and warnings that others have sounded regarding arbitration. Arbitration ha 
its own pitfalls. As one comrnentator has remarked, 'arbitrators are, well 
arbitrary. ' 9 The American experience regarding arbitration of securities lav 
violations should give these reformers smne second thoughts. 
Arbitration in the United States does not provide the litigant with th1 
protection of rules of discovery, rules of evidence, Endings of fact, o 
conclusions of law. 10 
Arbitrators, unlike judges, are discouraged from giving reasons for thei 
decisions. The President of the American Arbitration Association candidl; 
advised, 'Written opinions can be dangerous because they identify targets fo: 
the losing party to attack. ' 11 Arbitration is like sausage: if we knew how it wa: 
made, we would be much less confident of the results. 
The Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Express, Inc v McMahon, 12 recent]; 
held that broker-dealers can force their customers who have signed pre-dispuu 
arbitration agreements to arbitrate securities fraud dai1ns brought uncle! 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 1 Ob-5 and Section 1 O(b) of th< 
Securities and Exchange Act of l 934." 
Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 Journal of Legal Education 570, 571 (1983). 
D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 101 (Princeton University Press, 1987). 
Scheibla, Big Decision, Can You Sue a Broker.), Barron's, Mar. 2, 1987, at 16, col. 3. 
For a thoroug·h study and critique of Alternative Dispute Resolution ('ADR '), including a case study o 
the Neighbourhood Justice Centre in Kansas City, see C. Harrington, Shadow Justice: The Idcolog;. 
and Institutionalisation of Alternatives to Court (Greenwood Press 1985). 
JO See Note, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or Arbitration, 61 Washington Law Review 245, 260· 
61 (1986) (securities arbitration does not protect investors and must be 'substamially improved'); Note 
Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1931, 1986 Duke Law Journal 54t 
(discussing many flaws that exist in securities arbitration, and explaining how these flaws severely hurl 
investors). 
11 Scheibla, Big Decision, Can You Sue a Broker?, Barron's, Mar. 2, 1987, at p.33, col. 4. AccordR. Coulson, 
Busines~ Arbitration~ What You Need To Know 26 (1980). 
;2 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987). 
J3 The Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko~·. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) on the question whether 
broker-dealers could force their customers to arbitrate claims under§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
rather than seck relief in federal court. Wilko had held that. a cour1 cannot compel arbitration of a §12(2; 
claim even though the customer had signed a predisputc agreement to arbitrate. Wilko reasoned: 'th~ 
protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure their 
effectiveness.' 346 U.S. at 437. (As this Note went to press, the US Supreme Court by a 5-4 majority 
overruled Wilko: see Rodriguez de Quijas, et al ~'. Shearson/American Express Inc., No. 88-385 US Supreme 
Court, 15 May 1989). 
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The broker-dealer insists on arbitration, while the customer refuses, because 
both know that securities arbitration favours the broker-dealer. In a securities 
arbitration, often the chairperson is another stock-broker. We should not be 
surprised if a broker-dealer is not the most detached, neutral observer to judge 
his fellow broker-dealer. 14' The broker-dealer who is the arbitrator in one case 
may well be the respondent in the next case. The so-called independent 
arbitrators on the securities arbitration panel often are practicing lawyers who 
represent other broker-dealers and have a similar mind-set. 15 It is not surprising 
that the defendant seeks compulsory arbitration because the defendant/brokers 
view that as being in their best interest. 
Following the Supreme Court decision in McMahon, the securities regulators 
of various states have tried, by state regulation, to limit the power of brokers to 
insist that customers agree to arbitrate any disputes growing out of the purchase 
or sale of stocks, bonds, and other securities. The director of consumer 
education for the North American Securities Administrators Association has 
said that there is a laundry list of reasons behind this eflort to forbid mandatory 
arbitration. The most obvious complaints - 'The [arbitration] panels are 
stacked in favour of the industry, the proceedings are not public and there are 
no written decisions.' 16 
American arbitration decisions arc also quite difficult to overturn on appeal, 
even when one of the arbitrators had a conflict of interest that would have 
required disqualification of a federal judgeY Fortunately, federal courts have 
mitigated the harshness of that rule by according securities arbitration limited 
res judicata and collateral estoppel effects. 18 
14 E.g., Chemerinsky, Protection Lawyers from their Profession: Redljining the Lawyer's Role, 5 Journal of the 
Legal Profession 31, 31· (1980) (lawyers likely to derive their personal beliefs from their professional 
behaviour; thus, when lawyers represent clients' positions, eventually lawyers adopt clients' attitudes). 
C!f. Rotunda, The Combination of Funrtions in Adminstrative Actions: An Examination of European Alternatives 40 
Fordham Law Review 101, 102-03 (1971). 
JJ Scheibla, Big Decision, Can You Sue a Broker), Barron's, Mar. 2, 1987, at 16, col. 3. 
16 Quoted in, Harlan, Massachuse/ls Says Brokers Can 'i Insist on Arb1"trat1·on, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 27, 
1988, atp.37, col. 5-6(midwestedition). 
17 Merit Insurance Co. u. Lea/herby Insurance Co., 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.), certiorari denied, 464 C.S. 1009 
(1983). See also, Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 57 \J.S.L.W. 2164 (S.D.N.Y., july 28, 1988) (federal 
court overturns its earlier decision upsetting an arbitration award even though that earlier decision has 
ruled that the arbitrators had manifested 'evidence partiality' in favour of the broker-dealer). 
18 E.g., O'Neill v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 654 F. Supp. 34-7 (N.D. Ill. 1987), where the federal 
district court refused to apply collateral estoppel to a previously arbitrated Section lOB-5 fraud claim 
because it was not dear what standard of proof the arbitrators had applied. The Court noted that 
because the arbitrators' pe'rfunctory decision and lack of a written opinion revealed nothing about the 
standard of proof used, it was possible that they did not apply the preponderance of evidence test used in 
federal securities law. 
See also, Tamariu. Bache&Company(Lebanon)S.A.L, 637 F. Supp. 1333,1337,1341, 1342(N.D.lll. 
1986); Ujheil Construction Company v. Town of New Windsor, 478 F. Supp. 766, 768·69 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
See generally, Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 University of 
California-Los Angeles Law Review 623 (1988). 
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The tilt in the scales of justice in favour of defendants in cases of securities 
arbitration may be illustrated by the simple fact that broker-dealers, when they 
are plaintiffs, prefer to file suit in federal court rather than proceed with 
arbitration. When the securities dealers and brokers are defendants, their 
perspective changes and they insist on arbitration of custo:r:ller complaints, as in 
McMahon. In the year following the October, 1987 stock market crash, when the 
number of claims for arbitration increased over 329%, n1any brokers and 
securities firms found themselves as plaintiffs trying to collect margin money 
from their customers. Some disgruntled brokers were forced to arbitrate. 
Brokers accounted for 20% of the arbitration cases filed during the first three 
months of 1988. In contrast, during all of 1987, brokers were plaintiffs in 
arbitration cases only 9% of the time. Yet, such figures on the use of arbitration 
by brokers are misleading. When brokers became plaintiffs, many preferred to 
file lawsuits in federal court, not arbitration claims before the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), because courts offer much more 
protection. Such brokers made no effort to inform their customers that they 
could insist on compulsory arbitration in light of the McMahon decision. J'l 
The move to encourage arbitration is not lilnited to disputes involving federal 
securities laws. In an effort to reduce expensive litigation, some courts now 
require the parties to engage in so-called 'mandatory' arbitration, followed by a 
full trial if either party objects to the arbitration award. At this trial, evidence of 
the arbitration and the results are inadmissible. 20 The hope, apparently, is that 
this pre-litigation hurdle will encourage settlement. Although these efforts are 
well-intentioned, they may well result in more expense, not less, and increased 
delay, not expedition. This new procedure requires the parties to cross an extra 
hurdle before they reach trial, when the jury verdict really is mandatory and not 
advisory. 
Warren Burger, while Cbiefjustice, praised those law schools that now offer 
courses in arbitration, alternative dispute resolution and negotiation, and 
blamed some of the 'litigation explosion' on those law schools who have not 
placed sufficient emphasis on the advantages of arbitration. 21 That viewpoint is, 
19 See, Antilla, Brokerages Cal! On Courts to Get Margin Money, USA Today, March 28,1988, p. 8B, col. 1. 
This article noted: 'When you're the culprit and the broker is the plaintiff, brokerages suddenly get 
more enthusiastic about the prospects of having a day in court - even when the broker and customer 
previously have agreed to use arbitrators to resolve disagreements.' Cf \Vinkler, Qw"ck & Reilly Ordered to 
Pay Client $2 Million in Crash Selloul, WaJl Street journal, Dec. 1, 1988, at p. Cl & Cl7 (brokerage house 
seeks to go to federal court rather than to honour a proceeding before New York Stock Exchange 
arbitration panel). 
20 See, e.g., 15 Bar Report 5 (Wash. D.C. Bar, Feb.-N1ar. 1987). 
21 Burger, Isn't There a Belter Way?, 68 American Bar Association journal 274·, 275 (1982): 'Law Schools 
have traditionally steeped the students in the adversary tradition rather than in the skills of resolving 
conflicts.. . [T]wo of those 'nonjudicial routs' [to reduce litigation] are arbitration and negotiation, and 
it is very encouraging to find a new law school [the Law School of the City University of 1\'ew York] 
opening with this fresh approach.' 
Cautionary Lessons from American Securities Arbitration 203 
frankly, unsophisticated. When Americans turn to the courts, it is usually not 
because lawyers, bred to be litigious in American law schools, urge their clients 
to make mountains out of molehills; on the contrary, en1pirical studies show 
that lawyers are not typically the ones pushing their clients to litigate. In the 
paradigm case the lawyers for both sides urge settlement; it is the clients who 
want to litigate and reject efforts to compromise.22 
To learn of alternative remedies in law school is, of course, useful, but let us 
not be naive. Teaching future lawyers about negotiation, settlement and 
arbitration will not make them less litigious. We law professors simply do not 
have that much power to change human nature. A recent study of German legal 
ethics illustrates this simple fact of life. On the surface, German training of 
lawyers appeared to promote a systern much less litigious than our own. Yet 
appearances were deceiving. When one looked below the surface, the study 
demonstrated that the German legal system was just as litigious as the Arnerican 
system. Germany, like the United States, turns out an enormous number of 
lawyers each year (though the numbers may be deceiving because Germany, 
unlike the United States, distinguishes between advocacy and advice). German 
law heavily regulates fees in an effort to encourage settlement, but, in practice, 
such regulation has increased lawyer fees and has delayed settlement, because 
the German lawyers often postpone settlement until the eleventh hour in order 
to increase their regulated fees. Lawyers in Germany, like lawyers in this 
country, commonly believe that their legal opponents engage in frivolous 
motions and frivolous appeals, and in delaying actions. 23 We may look wistfully 
22 B. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey 229 (American Bar 
Foundation, 1977) (survey showing that 87% of the respondents agreed with the following statement: 
'Lawyers try bard to solve their client's problems without having to go to court'; and 80% agreed with 
the following statement: '~ost lawyers' work consists of helping clients arrange their affairs so as to 
avoid future problems and disagreements.'). 
Compare, for example, American lawyers to Australian lawyers. 'In Australia, 19% of the instances in 
which a lawyer was consulted in a grievance did not mature into a dispute. The U.S. figure is 24%. In 
other words, American lawyers are more likely to dampen disputes.' Galanter, Reading the Landscape of 
Disjmies: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious Society, 31 
University of California·Los Angeles Law Review 4, 60 ( 1983). Americans may appear to be more likely to file 
lawsuits than Australians, apparently because filing is culturally more a pan of the settlement process. 
Id. Yet Australians are substantially more likely to engage in an actual dispute. Fitzgerald, Grievances, 
Disputes and Outcomes: A Comparison of Australia and the United States, 1 Law In Context 15, 25(1983). 
23 Luban, The Sources of Legal Ethics: A German-American Comparison of Lawyen' Professional Duties, 48 Rables 
Zeithschrift245, 281, 284(1984). 
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to Europe, but when we look more closely, we see ourselves in a mirror. 24 
Those in the United States who see compulsory arbitration as an elixir for a 
perceived litigation crisis, should consider the problems carefully before they 
drink too deeply. Like the American Indians who thought that they were selling 
the new settlers concurrent hunting rights, but were later startled to learn that 
they had sold title in fee simple absolute, those who wish to trade· in judicial 
protections for arbitration may soon learn that they have made a similar 
bargain. Professor Ronald D. Rotunda 
24 Professor Luban 's study concludes: 'German legal ethics is adversarial ethics.' Luban, supra at 280. See 
also id. at 207 ('Ultimately, the lesson may be that no system of procedural justice with a private bar can 
evade the paradox that underlies adversarial ethics - the paradox deriving from the fact that the system 
of justice creates its own antagonists.') (footnote omitted). 
